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The modern rule seems to be to impose some kind of liability without
fault upon the manufacturer so that he will exercise greater care in the
manufacture of articles of food for human consumption. If the public
is to be protected from inefficient and unsanitary methods of production
some manner of penalizing the manufacturers for their mistakes is
necessary. Dean Pound expressed his ideas on the subject some years
ago when he said that the best way to protect the public is to impose
liability without fault upon the manufacturers of food.' 9 Only in this
way will the manufacturers continue to improve methods of production.
G.O.A.
WILLS
COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE ADMISSION TO PROBATE OF A
WILL - EXECUTION - SIGNING IN THE ATTESTATION
CLAUSE AS SIGNING AT THE END UNDER GENERAL CODE
SEC. 10504-3.
An instrument dated April 16, 1927 was admitted to probate on
June 9, 193o, as the last will and testament of W. L. Eakins. The
signature of the testator, Eakins, appeared only in the attestation clause.
On July 14, 1938, another instrument, dated November 15, 1926,
was offered to probate as the last will and testament of Eakins, and
was refused on the ground that the 1927 instrument had already been
admitted. On appeal a collateral attack was made on the admission of
the later instrument, on the ground that the probate court had no juris-
diction to admit to probate an instrument not signed at the end, as
required by the Ohio statute.' The court sustained the attack, and held
that the jurisdiction of the probate court is limited to wills as prescribed
by the Constitution and statute; and where it is apparent on the face
of the instrument that such instrument does not even purport to be a
will, the probate court has no jurisdiction to admit it as such. In re
AMatter of Will of Eakins.2
The right to make a testamentary disposition is purely of statutory
creation, and is available only upon compliance with the requirements of
the statute.3 A usual provision and one which appears in the Ohio statute,
is that a "will must be signed at the end." The apparent reason for
this rule is to insure identity of the instrument, and to prevent fraudulent
" Pjund, The End of the Law (1914) 27 HARv. L. REv. 195, Z33-
OHio G.C. sec. 10504-3.
263 Ohio App. z6S, z6 N.E. (7d) z9, 16 Ohio Op. 586 (z939).
3Tyrrel's Case, 17 Ariz. 418, 153 Pac. 767, 768 (i915).
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additions to or alterations of the instrument.4 However, in applying
this rule, many problems have arisen in determining when in fact a will
is signed at the end within the legislative intent. Two general lines of
interpretation have developed: one emphasizes a spatial aspect, in that
it requires that the signature be at the "physical end" or that part farthest
from the beginning;' the other requires that it be at the close of the
language, read in its natural and logical order." Under either of these
two views the signature must come after the last disposing provision
of the will.' The Ohio courts take the more liberal view, in recognizing
the line of interpretation which holds the will to be signed at the end,
when it is signed after the last disposing provision, as determined by the
natural and logical order of reading.' It has been held in another state,'
and in some inferior Ohio courts,1" that where the testator has signed
in the body of the attestation clause, as in the present case, with the
intent that it be his signature in the execution of his will, such signature
may be properly regarded as signed at the end. But on these facts the
Supreme Court of Ohio has held"' that where the signature appears
only in the body of the attestation clause, the will is not properly signed
at the end.
In the principal case an attack was made on the admission to probate
of the 1927 will. This was in an independent action, brought for the
sole purpose of establishing a prior will. Such an attack is a collateral
attack on the judgment of the probate court. 2 Had this proceeding
"Glancy v. Glancy, 17 Ohio St. 134 (1886); Baker v. Baker, Si Ohio St. 217, 37
N.E. 25 (1894).
'In re Andrews, i6z N.Y. a, S6 N.E. 529, 48 L.R.A. 662, 76 Am. St. Rep. 616
(19oo); It% re Whitney's Will, 153 N.Y. 259, 47 N.E. 272, 6o Am. St. Rep. 6x6 (I897);
In re O'Neil's Will, 9x N.Y. S16 (I883).
'Chandler v. Dockman, 8 Ohio App. 113, 28 Ohio C.A. 297, 29 Ohio C.D. 405(1917); Irwin v. Jacques, 71 Ohio St. 395, 73 N.E. 683, 69 L.R.A. 422, II Ann. Cas.
xoo8 (19o4); Sears v. Sears, 77 Ohio St. 1o4, 8z N.E. 1o67, 17 L.R.A. (N.s.) 353
(x9o4.); Mader v. Apple, 8o Ohio St. 691, 89 N.E. 37, 23 L.R.A. (N.s.) 515, 131 Am.
St. Rep. 719 (1908).
The real distinction is that in the second view, a will is validated where the pages
are not in consecutive order or are deranged, and yet the end is determined by the
"logical order" of reading. AvrmsoN, WILLS, p. 257.
'The signature must come after all disposing provisions, but the presence of a blank
space above the signature is immaterial if the signature is immediately below the
testimoxium clause. Mader v. Apple, 8o Ohio St. 691, 89 N.E. 37, 23 L.R.A. (N..)
515, 131 Am. St. Rep. 719 (1908); Chandler v. Dockman, 8 Ohio App. 113, 28 Ohio
CA. 297 (1917).
'See note 5, supra.
"In re Rudolph's Estate, x8o App. Div. 486, 167 N.Y.Supp. 760 (917); In re
Jarvis' Will, 24. Misc. 563, zo8 N. Y. Supp. 796 (1925).
"Estate of Arminda S. Wilson, z Ohio N.P. (N.s.) 189, 39 Ohio L. Bull. 379
(1904); In re Case's Will, 214 N.Y. Supp. 678, 126 Misc. 704. (926).
'Sears v. Sears, 77 Ohio St. 104, 82 N.E. 2o67, 17 L.R.A. (N.a.) 353, ii Ann.
Cas. zoo8 (1907).
'Where "the action or proceeding has an independent purpose and contemplates
some other relief or result, although the overturning of the judgment may be important
or even necessary to its success, then the attack upon the judgment is collateral." I Br.AcK,
JunGmENTS (2d ed.), sec. 252, p. 276.
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been an action to vacate the judgment of the probate court, it would
have been a direct attack.13 As a general rule, the judgment of the
probate court is not open to a collateral attack, since it is a court of
record, when the court has jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter
in any particular case.' Assuming jurisdiction, a party must bring a
direct proceeding to contest the judgment, and this judgment is not
open to a collateral attack, even though the determination of the cause
is erroneous." Want of jurisdiction, however, would render such a
judgment void. 6 In this event a collateral attack would be proper.1"
Therefore, in the principal case, it would seem that if the court was jus-
tified in sustaining the collateral attack this would have to be because the
admission to probate of a will signed in the attestation clause was beyond
the jurisdiction of the court. But it would seem that this is not a juris-
dictional fact, for jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine a
cause.'" The question remains whether the place of the signature is
jurisdictional, and for this we must look to the statute. Section 10504
of the Ohio General Code provides that "if it appears that such will
was duly attested and executed. . . . the court shall admit to probate."
In determining what will constitute due execution, we must refer to
section 10504-3 of the General Code where we find the requirement
"signed at the end." The determination as a matter of law that a will
is or is not signed at the end is a question of interpretation and con-
struction. Here the probate court had found as a matter of law that
where the signature appeared in the attestation clause it was validly
signed, and being so signed, admitted it to probate. If we wish to follow
consistently the law of judgments, the challenge of such conclusion
should not be by collateral attack, but only by a direct proceeding brought
for that purpose. The probate court is of limited jurisdiction,'" and can
only exercise such powers as the Constitution and statutes confer upon
it. -1 But the limitation relates chiefly to subject matter, and if the
"Onio G.C. sec. 10501-17.
"A direct attack on a judgment is an attempt to avoid or correct it in some manner
provided by law, in a proceeding instituted for that very purpose ... " 34 C.J. 520,
-ec. 827. Alto see i BLAcK, JUmGMENTs, sec. 252, p. 376.
"
4 Bigelow v. Bigelow, 4 Ohio 138, 19 Am. Dec. 323 (i8z9); Newman v. City of
Cincinnati, xS Ohio 323 (1849)i Cochran v. Loring, 17 Ohio 409 (1848); Dunham v.
Jones, 159 U.S. 584, x6 Sup. Ct. 1o, 40 L. Ed. 267 (189S).
The Union Savings Bank and Trust Co. v. The Western Telegraph Co., 79 Ohio
St. 89, o, 86 N.E. 478 (x9o8).
5
"Le::ee of Pain v. Mooreland, i5 Ohio, 436 (z846); Nye v. Stillwell & Co., sz
Ohio C.C. 40, 5 Ohio C.D. 335 (iS96); Commercial Gazette Co. v. Dean, ii Ohio Dec.
Rep. 207, 25 Ohio L. Bull. z5o (iS9i).
"
7 Nye v. Stillwell & Co., xz Ohio C.C. 40, 5 Ohio C.D. 335 (1896).
'
5 Sprankle v. Odell, 78 Ohio St. 404, 85 N.E. 1132 (1908).
"Estate of Ferguson, Si Ohio St. 58, 89 N.E. 1070 (1909).
' Mansfield v. Cole, 16 Ohio N.P. (N.s.) 209, 25 Ohio D. (N.s.) 231 (1914).
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subject matter is within the jurisdiction, it is not, as to it, a court of
limited jurisdiction. 2' As another Ohio case held,2" the probate courts
have full power to adjudicate fully and finally all questions arising in
matters properly before them.
Therefore, it would seem that in the principal case the appellate
court should not have permitted the collateral attack on the judgment
of the probate court in regard to the will of 1927, but rather should
have denied such an attack, leaving the plaintiff to his right to bring
a direct proceeding attacking the judgment. The fact that the statute
of limitations has run on such a direct proceeding,23 leaving the plaintiff
without a remedy, does not justify the rendering of an erroneous decision
in sustaining the present attack on the admission to probate of this later
dated will. S.D.G.
INTENT TO EXECUTE AN INSTRUMENT INCOMPLETE
ON ITS FACE
The Probate Court of Montgomery County recently rendered a
decision admitting to probate as a valid will an instrument in which the
residuary devise terminated with an incomplete sentence. The name of
the devisee had not been inserted in the blank left by the testator for that
purpose. The remainder of the will appointed an executor but made no
other dispositions. The court found that the instrument was executed
anmo testandi and admitted it to probate, in the face of the contention
that since it was incomplete on its face, the testatrix must not have
regarded the instrument to be the final embodiment of her intent, but
had contemplated some further act to complete it. The only evidence
outside of the instrument itself in regard to the testatrix's intent was that
she had called the two subscribing witnesses to her home and stated to
them that she had made out her will and had requested them to act as
witnesses.'
There are several classes of cases similar to the principal one in which
the court must decide whether or not the instrument before it reflects
the final testamentary intent of the deceased. Such classes include cases
in which a partially executed will is formally executed in regard to
personalty, but not complete in regard to devising realty; cases in which
the testator has become physically incapacitated before completing the
will, in jurisdictions which do not require signing; cases in which a
"Brown v. Reed, 56 Ohio St. 264, 46 N.E. 98z (1897).
22 Wilberding v. Miller, go Ohio St. 46, io6 N.E. 665 (1914).
'Omio G.C. sec. 11640.
'In re Crowe, x7 Ohio Op. 8, 31 Ohio L. Abs. 35 (1940).
